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ABSTRACT
Economists have generally assumed that to the extent possible, retirement savings should
be done in a tax-deferred account. However, the advent of Roth-style tax-favored
accounts and concerns about the tax implications of increasing retirement income through
tax-deferred distributions indicate that this question merits a reevaluation. I use data on
married couples in the HRS and NBER's TAXSIM model to measure the probability of a
household facing a higher tax rate at ages 62, 65, and 69 than the household faced at age
57. When the marginal tax rate is higher, the household could decrease their lifetime tax
by choosing a Roth-style account over a tax-deferred account. I also measure the
probability of facing a marginal tax rate that is sufficiently high that the household
minimizes tax payments by using a taxable account rather than a tax-deferred account, in
the absence of a Roth option. I find that for distributions beginning at age 69, between 10
and 35% of households with taxable income at age 57 should prefer a Roth account to a
tax-deferred account, but very few households prefer a taxable account.
Thesis Supervisor: James Poterba
Title: Department Head and Mitsui Professor of Economics
Since the 1980s, the US has moved from a pension system dominated by defined
benefit (DB) plans-that is, pensions that pay out an annual benefit based on the
worker's final salary and years of service-to one dominated by defined contribution
(DC) plans, such as 401(k) plans (see Buessing and Soto (2006)). This change has
attracted much attention from economists, as the switch exposes plan participants to a
very different set of risks than the previous regime. In addition, plan participants must
make a number of decisions that previously were made for them by plan administrators,
such as how much to save, how to invest the assets, and how quickly to consume their
wealth in retirement. One decision that has not received much attention is the choice of
what type of account to use for retirement savings. This is in part because conventional
wisdom has been that the answer is straightforward-workers at a firm offering a 401 (k)
or similar plan should take advantage of the tax-favored treatment of these accounts.
In recent years, this answer has become unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the
2006 advent of Roth 401 (k) plans, in which contributions are subject to taxation but then
accrue gains tax-free, as an alternative to traditional tax-deferred 401(k)s, with tax-
deductible contributions and taxable distributions, means that this answer is incomplete.
When both options are available, a worker must decide how to allocate her retirement
savings across tax treatments. Secondly, a recent paper argues that using a tax-deferred
401(k) may not be advantageous for all households, even if a Roth option is not available
(see Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Neumann, 2001). It finds that for those with low retirement
income, taking distributions from a tax-deferred account can raise the degree to which
Social Security benefits are taxable, such that this additional taxation swamps the benefit
of the tax-deferral. This means that when only a tax-deferred 401(k) plan is available-
and there is no increase in compensation associated with participation in the plan-some
lower income workers are better off saving for retirement outside of the plan.
This paper seeks to shed light on the decision of what type of account to use in
saving for retirement by investigating the patterns of taxation facing married households
as they age, using data on income and other determinants of taxation from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS), and making use of NBER's TAXSIM program to calculate the
marginal tax rate on a dollar contributed to or distributed from a tax-deferred account.
When comparing Roth and tax-deferred savings accounts, the only difference in the after-
tax value of an equivalent investment is the marginal tax rate faced at the time the tax is
levied, either at contribution or at distribution. Similarly, I will later show that the value
of access to a tax-preferred account can be expressed in terms of the marginal tax rate
associated with such an account that would yield the same after-tax balance as a regular
taxable account. Thus marginal tax rates at different ages are a sufficient statistic for the
factors that make various savings vehicles more or less attractive to a household seeking
to maximize consumption.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the related literature on tax-favored
accounts and retirement savings. The second section provides background information
on tax-favored savings accounts and Social Security benefit taxation. Next, I describe my
data and the TAXSIM program used to calculate marginal tax rates. I also describe the
sample used in my analysis and examine the distribution of income over my sample
period. Then I investigate the question of how often the marginal tax rate faced at the
time of withdrawal from a tax-favored account exceeds the rate faced at the time of
contribution, and how-often the marginal rate is enough higher to imply that a tax-
deferred account would be dominated by a fully taxable account. This is accompanied by
a discussion of what seems to be causing the higher marginal rates. The penultimate
section considers strategies that a household might employ to minimize tax costs
resulting from tax-deferral, and the final section concludes.
1. Literature Review
Buessing and Soto (2006) reports a shift in the pension landscape between 1981
and 2003. In 1981, more than eighty percent of workers covered by a pension plan had
DB coverage, and perhaps a quarter of these had a DC plan as well. In contrast, by 2003,
more than sixty percent of pension covered workers depended solely upon a DC plan.
Other work on this transition suggests that in the eighties, the proliferation of DC plans
was mostly due to the adoption of such plans by new firms and to the addition of
secondary plans by existing firms, rather than a switch away from DB plans by
established companies. However, by the nineties and early two thousands, firms with
both types of plans were less likely to offer the traditional pension plan to new workers,
and in some cases DB plan benefits were frozen at the accrued value for all workers at
the firm. Also, between the late nineties and 2003, cash balance plans (nominally defined
benefit but in practicality very similar to defined contribution plans) expanded swiftly,
though legal questions have since brought that growth to a halt.
One of the early questions raised by the proliferation of tax-deferred savings
accounts is whether such accounts represent new savings or simply a transfer of existing
assets or planned savings to the tax-favored vehicle. The debate is summarized in Engen,
Gale and Scholz (1996) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996). Essentially, Engen, Gale
and Scholz (1996) argue that much of the.balance in Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs) is not likely to represent new savings, but Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) counter
that much of the balance of 401(k) plans consists of savings that would not have been
done without the availability of such plans.
Another important question raised by the transition from DB to DC pensions is
how the risk profile facing workers has changed. Bodie, Marcus and Merton (1988)
discussed the different types of risks faced by participants in either type of plan, but data
was not brought to this issue until recently. Samwick and Skinner (2004) use data on DC
and DB plans from the Survey of Consumer Finances, along with synthetic earnings
histories to compare the present discounted value (PDV) of wealth accumulations under
each regime. They find that for many workers, DC plan accumulations are likely to
exceed the PDV of DB plan benefits. Schrager (2005) studies a similar question using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and finds that increasing job turnover in the
nineties has made DC plans relatively more attractive to workers. Poterba, Rauh, Venti
and Wise (2007) use the HRS to simulate DB and DC plan balance distributions for each
household and find that although DC plans yield a higher PDV than private-sector DB
plans, they are also more likely to generate very low retirement balances.
Recently a few papers have investigated the question of how to optimally make
use of available vehicles for retirement savings. As mentioned previously, it had
generally been assumed that tax-favored accounts are the optimal means of accumulating
retirement wealth. However, Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Neumann (2001), showed that for
low-income households, making maximum contributions to a tax-deferred account could
theoretically increase the lifetime tax burden by incurring the taxation of Social Security
benefits. In addition, Kotlikoff, Marx and Raphson (2008) considers the question of
whether a tax-deferred or Roth account is preferable under different assumptions about
future tax regimes. My paper differs from these first because I use actual earnings
histories from the HRS rather than simulated earnings histories, allowing me to observe
stochastic variations in earnings paths over time. In addition, I can calculate what
percentage of households have earnings such that they could be exposed to the Social
Security taxation trap exposed by Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Neumann (2001). My paper is
also unique in that I consider the optimality of using tax-favored accounts both when a
Roth option is or is not available, and that I focus on savings vehicle decision when the
household is already close to retirement age.
2. Institutional Background
2.1 Value of Tax-favored Accounts
Currently, the US tax code allows for many types of tax-favored accounts. Some
of the most common include traditional Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), tax-
deferred 401(k)s and similar accounts, and Roth versions of both IRAs and 401(k)s.
Table 1 summarizes key aspects of the different types of accounts, and further details of
the history and characteristics of these accounts are described in the appendix. The
results in this paper will abstract from the details of the many different types of tax-
favored accounts available and consider three generic savings vehicles, denoted as a
taxable account, a tax-deferred account, and a Roth account. All of the accounts will
have the same investment opportunities. The taxable account will be funded with after-
tax dollars, and accruals will be taxed annually at a constant rate, with no tax due when
money is withdrawn from the account. Contributions to the tax-deferred account will be
tax-deductible, no tax will be levied on accruals within the account, and distributions will
be taxed as ordinary income as long as the account holder has reached the age of 59 V2.
In contrast, contributions to a Roth account are not deductible, but distributions of both
the principal and any accrual are non-taxable after age 59 V2.
Tax-deferred and Roth accounts are considered tax-favored because they
eliminate the taxation of income from assets held in such accounts. More explicitly, a
pre-tax contribution of C made at time 0 and held in a taxable account that accrues value
continuously at a pre-tax rate of r for T periods will yield the following balance at time T,
with the contribution taxed at the marginal ordinary income rate that applies in time 0, rio,
and capital income taxed each period at the constant rate r,:
balancertax ble = (1- Tr°)Ce r(1-rr)T
Holding funds in a tax-deferred account (TDA) causes three changes: it eliminates the
tax on capital income (or sets ,r equal to zero), eliminates the income taxability at time 0,
and causes the full balance to be taxed when it is withdrawn in time T at the marginal
ordinary income rate riT, yielding the following after tax balance:
balanceTDA = (1- riT)Ce rT
In contrast, holding funds in a Roth account only eliminates the capital income tax, but
does not change the timing of income taxation. The following equation describes the
balance:
Roth 0 rTbalanceT h = (1- tij)Ce
Thus, if the tax rate is constant, the tax-deferred and Roth accounts are equivalent,
although the reported balance in a tax-deferred account will appear larger because taxes
have not yet been levied. Both have a higher after-tax balance than a taxable account
facing the same marginal income tax rate, because they avoid capital income taxation.
Some examples are shown in Table 2; the first column shows the ratio of the pre-tax
contribution to the after-tax balance for a taxable account facing different marginal rates,
assuming a capital income tax rate of 15%, a nominal interest rate of either 6 or 10%, and
a holding period of either five or twelve years. The second column shows the same ratio
for a Roth or tax-deferred account associated with a given marginal rate.
From these equations and the table, it is clear that for any marginal tax rate, the
Roth account will be preferred to the taxable account. Similarly, the choice between tax-
deferred and Roth accounts is straightforward, and depends only on the marginal income
tax rates that apply at the time of contribution and withdrawal of the funds-if the
marginal rate is higher at the time of contribution, the TDA is preferred, but if the
marginal rate is higher at the time of distribution, the Roth account will be preferred.
Comparing the taxable account with the tax-deferred account is slightly more difficult
when the tax rate can change over time. For example, table 2 shows that for either a five
or twelve year holding period and a 6% nominal interest rate, a tax-deferred account
facing a marginal rate of 28% or above is inferior to a taxable account facing a rate of
15% or less. However, if the interest rate is 10%, the taxable account with a 15% rate is
preferred to the tax-deferred account with a 28% marginal rate only for the five year
holding period-for the twelve year holding period, the benefit of tax-deferral
compensates for the higher marginal rate on this account. More generally, one can solve
the above equations for the tax rate that would cause the tax-deferred account to yield the
same balance as the taxable account:
ri * =1-(1- rioyerr r
For any riT greater than riT*, the taxable account will be preferred to the tax-deferred
account, and for any riT less than riT*, the tax-deferred account will be preferred. The riT*
that corresponds to a given rio is presented in column three of Table 2. The above
equation shows that TiT* will be increasing in ro, , r, and T. Intuitively, this means that
the benefits of a tax-deferred account are increasing with respect to the available return
on capital, the marginal rate of capital taxation, and the intended holding period of the
asset. Thus if an individual is choosing between taxable and tax-deferred accounts with
given marginal tax rates, a higher return on capital or a longer holding period will make
the tax-deferred account more attractive.
As noted in the introduction, conventional wisdom has been that marginal tax
rates in retirement are likely to be lower in retirement, or at least not higher, because of
the lack of labor income, so tax-deferred accounts are likely to be the way to go. Roth
accounts are only recommended early in the lifecycle of those that expect relatively high
tax rates in retirement, or perhaps for those that expect an increase in statutory rates in the
future. However, there is little evidence that marginal rates in retirement are relatively
low-first, because we know little about the paths of income before and after retirement,
and secondly because the complexity of the tax code--especially the phasing in and out
of various provisions-means that higher incomes do not always correspond to higher
marginal tax rates. For example, Gokhale, Neumann, & Kotlikoff (2001) finds that lower
income households may experience reduced lifetime consumption and higher lifetime
tax-bills as a result of fully participating in a tax-deferred 401(k) because of increased
taxability of Social Security benefits. This result can be linked to high marginal tax rates
associated with the phase-in of Social Security benefit taxability.
2.2 Social Security Taxability
As a response to long-term concerns about the viability of the Social Security
program, the Social Security Amendments of 1983 enacted several provisions to restore
solvency to the system over a seventy-five year horizon. Scheduled increases in the
payroll tax rate were accelerated, the full benefit retirement age was set to gradually
increase, and most importantly for the purposes of this paper, up to fifty percent of
household benefit payments became subject to taxation, with revenues flowing into the
Social Security trust fund. The income threshold above which benefits are taxable was
set at $25,000 for single households, and $32,000 for those married filing jointly and was
deliberately not indexed for inflation so that the taxability of benefits would be
introduced gradually. Ten years later, further reform set a second threshold ($34,000 and
$44,000, respectively), above which 85% of benefits become taxable.
To calculate the portion of Social Security benefits that are taxable, a household
starts with its adjusted gross income (AGI)-not including Social Security benefits-and
adds back in several items exempted from AGI including tax-exempt interest income.
They then add half of their Social Security benefits and fill out a worksheet that compares
this amount with the applicable thresholds. If the household's total is less than the first
threshold, none of the Social Security income is taxable. If the household's total is
between the two thresholds, the lesser of half of the difference from the total to the
threshold or half of benefits are taxable. If the total is above the second threshold, the
household similarly transitions to 85% taxability. The phasing in to higher levels of
benefit taxability occasions a jump in marginal tax rates-for example, if a household has
income such that they are in the first transition range, an additional dollar of taxable
income will cause another fifty cents of Social Security benefits to be subject to tax, so
the effective marginal tax rate is 1.5 times the statutory rate. Similarly, in the second
phase-in, the effective marginal rate can be up to 1.85 times the statutory rate. The width
of the transition range is directly linked to the amount of Social Security benefits
received.
How significant might the increased taxation of Social Security benefits be? Let
us consider the case of a married household that has $18,000 in taxable income as well as
Social Security benefits and a large tax-deferred account. In my HRS sample, average
Social Security benefits for a household with a 65-year-old male are around $12,000. If
the household takes no distributions from the tax-deferred account, or up to a $8,000
distribution, none of the Social Security benefits will be taxable. On the other hand, the
household could take a distribution from the account of $26,000 so that 85% of benefits,
or $10,200, is taxable. If we assume that the household takes the standard deduction,
they face a marginal tax rate of 15%, so they pay an extra $1530 in taxes. This is
equivalent to a 12.75% reduction in Social Security benefits. A distribution between
$8000 and $26000 would result in a lower tax penalty. If the household instead receives
the maximum possible benefit, about $28,000 (if both spouses claim benefits upon
reaching age 65 in 2003 and each had earnings that exceeded the upper limit on Social
Security taxation in each of the 35 previous years), any distribution from a tax-deferred
account will trigger Social Security benefit taxation. Benefit taxability again reaches
85% with a $26,000 distribution, and the household faces the same 12.75% reduction in
benefits, or a $3570 tax penalty. If the household's economic situation does not change,
it may face such a penalty year after year.
Some twenty years after taxability of Social Security benefits was introduced, the
fraction of households subject to the tax and the revenue collected still grow each year.
In the 2000 HRS, about one third of households receiving Social Security income pay
taxes on some portion of their benefits, and about one fifth have sufficient income levels
that 85% of benefits are taxable. For married households with Social Security income,
those numbers are half and thirty-five percent. Nationally, revenues collected from
Social Security benefit taxation have grown steadily over time, from about five billion
dollars in 1984 to more than twelve billion in 2006 (using constant 2003$), as shown in
Figure 1. The increase in revenue can be attributed to three things: first, the lack of
inflation indexing of the taxability threshold means that each year, more households are
subject to a tax; second, because benefit levels are based on a formula that inflates wages
by real wage growth rather than just inflation, real benefits are increasing over time; and
finally, the addition of the second threshold in 1993.
3. Data Description
Data for this paper comes from the HRS, a biannual survey of elderly and near-
elderly households starting in 1992. I construct variables for tax filing status, dependents,
age-exemptions, taxable income sources, and deductions using the survey responses of
married couples in the original HRS cohort from the 1992-2004 waves of the HRS,
generally following the methods of Rohwedder, et all (2005). This includes constructing
mortgage interest paid as a percentage of reported mortgage debt, with the percentage
reflecting the average annual interest rate paid on a 30-year loan as calculated by HSH
Associates'. I depart from the Rohwedder, et all (2005) method by using data from the
Social Security Administration (SSA) on earnings and Social Security benefits. HRS
asked respondents to give permission to access their earnings and benefits histories from
the SSA in both 1992 and 2004. I make use of the benefits histories and two types of
earning records provided by SSA that go back to 1980: w-2 earnings and Medicare
covered earnings. Unfortunately, SSA data cannot be merged with any geographic data
in the HRS, so I assume that all households are located in Massachusetts, following
Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Neumann (2001). In addition, I face one issue that Rohwedder,
et all (2005) did not-distinguishing between qualified and unqualified dividend income.
I assume that qualified dividends are a fixed fraction of total dividends, based on the
numbers reported by Marcia and Bryan (2007) from the Statistics of Income. Finally, I
use a variation of NBER's TAXSIM program to calculate the marginal tax rates for the
years the male member of the couple is or would be between the ages of 57 and 69, based
on a uniform 2003 tax code and Social Security benefit taxability thresholds
corresponding to their real values in each year.
In many cases, implementing TAXSIM at younger ages requires the extrapolation
of the values of input variables into the period before 1992. I have data on wages and
Social Security benefits in prior years, but other income variables must be extrapolated. I
assume that dividends and other capital income (which includes interest, rental, and
business income) remain constant in real terms, that pension income starts at the age
reported in the HRS and has a constant nominal value, and that no unemployment
insurance benefits are received. Deductions must also be extrapolated-I assume that
rent payments and property taxes remain constant in real terms, that charitable
' See http://www.hsh.com/mtghst.html
contributions are a constant, household-specific fraction of income, that there are no
deductible medical expenses, and that outstanding mortgage debt declines annually at an
household-specific rate.
For my analysis, I choose to use a tax code that is constant except for one
element: the Social Security benefit taxability thresholds decline in real terms over time
because of the lack of inflation indexing. To accomplish this, I convert all values into
2003 dollars and let TAXSIM calculate the AGI that would pertain in the absence of
Social Security income. I compare the AGI and the Social Security benefits received by
a household to the applicable real threshold and calculate the portion of benefits that are
taxable and the rate at which benefit taxability is being phased-in. Then I add taxable
benefits to ordinary income, rerun TAXSIM to get the marginal tax rate that applies to
non-wage income, and multiply this marginal rate by the appropriate factor to account for
the phasing in of benefit taxability. Table 3 shows the tax brackets of the 2003 tax code
that apply to households that are single and married filing jointly.
To streamline my analysis, I consider only couples that are married at the time I
begin my calculations-the year the male reaches age 57-and omit couples that
experience a divorce during my sample period. In addition, I must make several sample
restrictions due to data availability: both members of the couple must be alive in 1992
and linked to the SSA records, and the male must be born between 1926 and 1935, so
they are ages 57 to 62 in 1992, allowing me to construct the needed variables for all ages
between 57 and 69. The consequences of these sample restrictions on my sample size are
as follows: there are 7648 households in the 1992 HRS cohort, 4545 of which are married
both in 1992 and when the male is 57 years old. Further limiting the sample to couples
with the male born between 1926 and 1935 results in 2380 households, and dropping
those that experience a divorce leaves 2316 households. Of these, 1640 have SSA
records for both household members and make it into my sample.
Because I calculate marginal tax rates over a twelve year sample period, the
household may experience the death of one or both members. In the case of a widow(er),
the household files as single and faces the resulting tax brackets. If both household
members pass away, marginal tax rates for subsequent years are coded as missing. To
consider the effects of these sample composition choices, we can consider the fate of
HRS married couples with the male aged 57 in 1992. In 2004 the male has reached age
69, and we find that 73.1% of these households are still surviving as married couples.
For 21.1% of the couples, only a widow(er) remains, and 2.5% have both passed away.
Only 3.3% of couples have divorced over twelve years.
Summary statistics for the values of the variables that serve as inputs into
TAXSIM are shown in Table 4, for both age 57 and age 67, with the full sample in Panel
A. Throughout my analysis, households are weighted by their 1992 household weight. It
is clear that over time, households become less likely to receive wage and dividend
income, and more likely to receive income from property, pensions, and Social Security.
In addition, at age 67, households are less likely to be eligible to take tax-deductions for
property tax payments, mortgage interest payments, and charitable donations (the
contribution of medical deductions to these numbers is comparatively miniscule). A drop
in average wages for primary earners (usually males) at age 67 suggests that many may
only work part-time later in life, however, the increase in average secondary wages
implies that the lowest-earning women may be less likely to remain in the labor force.
The increase in average Social Security benefits suggests that those who wait longer to
claim benefits have significantly larger benefits.
Panel B of Table 4 shows summary statistics for the sample of households that
report holding a positive balance in a tax-deferred account in at least one wave of the
HRS, a sample consisting of 1206 households. A comparison of these two samples
suggests that households with tax-deferred accounts tend to have higher earnings at age
57 and more capital income at age 67, but are otherwise very similar. Households in this
sample may be slightly more likely to receive various income types and be eligible for
various deductions, but these differences are relatively small. Overall, these results
suggest that households with tax-deferred accounts have larger lifetime incomes than
others, which is consistent with other findings that both pension recipients and
households that save more tend to have higher incomes.
As noted in the introduction, the expectation of lower tax rates in retirement is
based on the idea that that taxable income will be lower after earnings have ceased.
Although this seems a reasonable assumption, it has not generally been examined.
Several papers have noted that since the 1970s, the economic status of the elderly has
improved and the incidence of poverty has declined (see Moon and Juster (1995) for an
overview). This may indicate that the assumption of lower income in retirement is
outdated. Indeed, Table 4 indicates that although both the probability and the level of
earnings decrease between ages 57 and 67, other types of income increase
simultaneously. In Figure 2, we can see that the profile of a broad income concept (AGI
plus non-taxable Social Security benefits) declines at a surprisingly shallow rate. At age
70, the income levels at the 2 5 th, 50 th and 7 5 th percentiles of the distribution are well over
half of the income level at age 55, when earnings are near their lifetime peak. Although
it is difficult to discern in the figure, income levels at the bottom of the distribution do
drop significantly, and upon reaching age 70 are not much more than a third of the age 55
level.
Marginal tax rates depend not on this broad income measure, but on taxable
income, which may exclude some Social Security benefits and capital income and also
takes into account a tax exemption for the elderly and a myriad of deductions and credits.
Figure 3 shows the profiles of taxable income for various quantiles, and all decline more
significantly that did the broader income concept. This implies that over time,
households shift from earned income to less heavily taxed sources of income, and may
also reap greater benefits from tax deductions and credits. However, the idiosyncratic
nature of this transition, particularly the timing of retirement by different households,
may lead to "churning" within the distribution at a higher rate than during the working
life. A comparison of the marginal tax rates facing individual households at different
ages can better show the probability of facing high rates when taking distributions from a
tax-deferred account.
4. Comparison of Marginal Tax Rates
4.1 First dollar MTR
I first consider the question of how households should allocate their first dollar of
retirement savings. I use Social Security covered wages (supplemented by w-2 earnings
for those over the taxable maximum) to determine marginal tax rates that apply before
making any tax-deferred contributions. Throughout this section, actual marginal tax rates
are divided into bins corresponding to the statutory rates. Most of the marginal rates
calculated by TAXSIM are tightly clustered around the statutory rates, but phase-ins and
phase-outs of deductions and Social Security benefit taxation cause some outliers. In
addition, the 33% and 35% bins are grouped together because of their low frequency.
The distribution of marginal tax rates faced at ages 57, 62, 65 and 69 are shown in Panel
A of Table 5. As households age, the proportion of households facing lower MTRs
increases, so that at age 69, almost one-third of households face a zero marginal rate and
just over two-thirds face a marginal rate of 15% or less. However, the fraction of
households facing a rate of 25% or more stays relatively stable around 10%, suggesting
that a portion of the population may have an income profile that does not significantly
decline with age.
Table 6 calculates the distribution of marginal tax rates at ages 62, 65, and 69 by
the marginal tax rate at age 57. Thus along the diagonals is the percentages of
households facing roughly the same marginal tax rate, and below the diagonal the
percentages of households facing higher marginal rates. In addition, Panel A of Table 7
summarizes the percentage facing higher rates at each age, or the percentage of
households that could lower their discounted lifetime tax payments by taking the first
dollar of their distribution from a Roth account rather than a tax-deferred account. At age
62, 46 to 48 % of households facing marginal rates of 0 or 10% at age 57 are now facing
higher rates, and 14 to 25% of households that faced rates of 15% or more at age 57. By
age 69, for households in the lowest age 57 bins these numbers drop to 33 to 35%, and to
10 to 19% for those facing higher marginal rates. This indicates that a non-trivial fraction
of households would pay less in taxes by choosing Roth accounts instead of tax-deferred
accounts, especially if they face low marginal rates at age 57 or plan to begin
distributions relatively soon.
In the second two panels of Table 7 are the percentages of households that would
pay less in taxes by using a taxable account than by taking distributions from a tax-
deferred account for a 6% and 10% nominal return on assets. These are the households
with marginal rates at ages 62, 65, and 69 that are higher than the equivalent marginal
rate for their age 57 tax rate, as explained in section 2.1. I first consider the case of a 6%
annual return on assets. Among households facing age 57 marginal rates of 10% or less,
upon reaching age 62, the fraction of households that prefer the taxable account is nearly
as high as the fraction that prefer the Roth-between 45% and 50%. Households facing a
15% marginal rate also have only a slightly lower probability of choosing the taxable
account-a drop from 25% to 22%. On the other hand, households facing higher rates at
age 57 are less likely to be better off using a taxable account--the fraction preferring a
taxable account is 40 to 80% lower than the fraction preferring a Roth. This lines up with
Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Neumann's (2001) assertion that some low-income households
may not realize a tax savings by using tax-deferred accounts. However, by age 69, the
fraction preferring the taxable account is much lower for all households facing positive
marginal rates at age 57, and is less than 3% for those with an age 57 marginal tax rate of
at least 25%. These overall patterns persist when a 10% nominal return is considered, but
even fewer households prefer taxable accounts. By age 69 and with asset returns of 6 and
10%, only 11.5% and 3.3% of all households pay lower lifetime taxes by using a taxable
account than by taking distributions from a tax-deferred account, and many of these faced
a zero marginal rate at age 57. Thus households with longer savings horizons are
unlikely to face a scenario in which taking retirement distributions from a tax-deferred
account is dominated by making use of a taxable account, and that probability drops as
nominal asset returns increase.
4.2 Last Dollar MTR: Sample with Tax-deferred Accounts
Next I focus on only those households reporting positive balances in tax-deferred
accounts and consider the question of whether such households have income histories
such that taking a reasonably sized distribution causes them to face higher marginal tax
rates in retirement than at age 57. For this portion of my analysis, I use only households
that report having a positive balance in a tax-deferred account in some wave of the HRS.
As noted previously, these households tend to have higher earnings than the full HRS
sample. I want to calculate the marginal tax rate that corresponds to the last dollar of the
distribution taken, to discover how many households would have been better off by
replacing some of their tax-deferred savings with savings in some other type of account.
I use wages as reported on w-2 forms rather than Social Security wages to account for
possible tax-deferred contributions to 401(k)s during the working life, and simulate
distributions at ages 62, 65 and 69 as a fraction of the reported or interpolated balance in
the account in that year, equal to the number of members of the couple still alive divided
by the sum of their life expectancies. The simulated distribution is not subtracted from
the remaining account balance, so at each age, my analysis can be thought of as assuming
that distributions start that year at a rate that is sustainable for the remaining life
expectancy of the couple. The size of the average simulated distribution is $7,138 and
does not vary greatly with age. In my sample, distributions are small relative to other
income sources. Because my sample reached age 62 by 1997, they have not.had as many
years to accumulate tax-favored savings as future cohorts will. Thus my calculations
should be taken as very conservative estimates of the impact of taking distributions on
last-dollar marginal tax rates in retirement.
Again, Tables 8 calculates the distribution of marginal tax rates at ages 62, 65,
and 69 by the marginal tax rate at age 57, and Panel A of Table 9 summarizes the
percentage facing higher rates at each age, or the percentage of households that could
lower their discounted lifetime tax payments by taking the last dollar of their distribution
from a Roth account rather than a tax-deferred account. These results follow the same
patterns evident in the first dollar MTR results for the full sample, though the fraction of
the population preferring a Roth is larger, especially for those facing very low marginal
tax rates. This suggests that among those facing very low marginal rates, households
with tax-deferred savings accounts are more likely to face a low rate only temporarily,
perhaps due to unemployment or unusually large deductions. At age 62, roughly three-
quarters of households facing marginal rates of 0 or 10% at age 57 are now facing higher
rates, and 16 to 32% of households that faced rates of 15% or more at age 57. By age 69,
about half of households in the lowest age 57 MTR bins face higher rates, and for those
facing higher marginal rates, the fraction that would have preferred a Roth account still
ranges from 9 to 28%. This indicates that many current holders of tax-deferred accounts
would pay less in taxes had they used Roth accounts in addition to tax-deferred accounts
and could take at least a portion of their distribution from the Roth account.
In the second two panels of Table 9 are the percentages of households that would
pay less in taxes by taking the last dollar of their distribution from a taxable account than
from a tax-deferred account for a 6% and 10% nominal return on assets. Again, the
results look very similar to the full sample results. Among households facing age 57
marginal rates of 15% or less, upon reaching age 62, only slightly fewer households
prefer the taxable account than prefer the Roth. On the other hand, households facing
higher rates at age 57 are less likely to be better off using a taxable account. However, by
age 69, the fraction preferring the taxable account is much lower for all households
facing positive marginal rates at age 57, and is less than 5% for those with an age 57
marginal tax rate of at least 25%. These overall patterns persist when a 10% nominal
return is considered, but even fewer households prefer taxable accounts. By age 69 and
with nominal asset returns of 6 or 10%, only 14% and 3.5%, respectively, of all
households in the sample would pay lower lifetime taxes by using a taxable account than
by taking distributions from a tax-deferred account.
4.3 Understanding Increases in Marginal Tax Rates
As we have seen, though few households would prefer a taxable account to a tax-
deferred account, a substantial minority is better off using a Roth account than a tax-
deferred account, because they face higher marginal tax rates later in life. Why might
they face higher rates? As mentioned before, they may simply have more taxable income
than previously, through some combination of full- or part-time earnings, capital income,
pension benefits, and Social Security benefits. Table 10 shows the distribution of taxable
income at ages 62, 65, and 69 into bins corresponding to the statutory rates, by the bin at
age 57. This table differs from Table 8 in that it does not account for the impact of
phase-ins and claw-backs on the actual marginal rates faced. It shows that for those with
age 57 taxable income placing them in the 15% bracket or lower, increases in taxable
income are responsible for nearly all of the increase in marginal tax rates at ages 62 and
65, and most of the increase at age 69. These might represent households that were
unemployed or underemployed and returned to work, or households that had retired but
were not yet receiving pension or Social Security benefits. For those with more
substantial taxable income at age 57, increases in taxable income also play a role in
raising marginal rates, accounting for between half and all of the marginal rate increases
at age 62, and between 35 and 60% of the marginal rate increases at age 69.
In thinking about increases in taxable income, it should be noted that households
that are still working full time are unlikely to be taking distributions from retirement
accounts, so increases for these households should not be a concern. Though retirement
is notoriously difficult to measure, we can measure whether individuals have any earned
income. Thus Table 11 shows the percentages of households at ages 62, 65, and 69 that
still have one or both members of the couple earning income for various cuts of the data.
As we compare different samples, those facing higher marginal rates at later ages are
much more likely to have one or both members of the couple still earning income. At age
62, more than 40% of households facing higher marginal rates have two wage-earners,
and more than 80% have at least one wage-earner. By age 69, these percentages have
dropped, but those with higher marginal rates are still much more likely to have earned
income than is the population at large.
If taxable income has not increased for a household but the marginal tax rate has,
two plausible reasons might be that the household has been widowed or that the
household is experiencing a phase-in of Social Security benefit taxation. After a
household is widowed, different tax brackets apply, so the same taxable income could
trigger a much higher rate. However, Table 12 shows that those facing higher marginal
tax rates are less likely to have been widowed than the full sample. This suggests that
widowing may incur a loss of pension or Social Security benefits, or that assets have been
used to cover end-of-life expenses, so less capital income is generated. This corresponds
to Current Population Survey data that show that elderly widows are more likely to be
impoverished than elderly couples (Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, 2004).
As explained in section 2.2, as a household is phasing into Social Security benefit
taxation, the marginal tax rate is increased by a factor of 1.5 for the first threshold and
1.85 for the second threshold. Thus the phase-in could be a significant factor
contributing to higher marginal tax rates. Table 13 shows the distribution of AGI plus
half of Social Security benefits across the thresholds of benefit taxability for households
receiving Social Security benefits in the full sample and among those facing higher
marginal tax rates. For any age group, in samples with higher marginal rates the
distribution shifts up, with a smaller fraction in the lowest income category and a larger
fraction in the highest category. This suggests that households with very low income
levels at later ages (as measured by AGI plus half of Social Security benefits) are less
likely to face higher marginal rates than they faced at age 57. This may occur because for
any level of age 57 taxable income, those with higher taxable income levels at later ages
are more likely to make it into a high MTR sample than those with lower taxable
incomes. In addition, at each age the fraction falling into a phase-in range with an
amplified MTR increases for samples with higher MTRs. This indicates that those that
fall into the phase-in ranges are more likely to face higher marginal tax rates. At age 62,
between 20 and 25% of those facing higher marginal rates are also experiencing a phase-
in of Social Security benefits. By age 69, the fraction increases to 42 to 48%. A
comparison with the fraction of these samples that have at least one wage earner-50 to
60%-suggests that the Social Security benefit taxability phase-in is only slightly less
important to triggering higher marginal tax rates than is continued labor supply. While
these numbers illustrate the potential importance of this aspect of the tax code, they also
suggest that many households that face higher marginal tax rates at age 69 could avoid
this outcome by adjusting the timing of Social Security benefit claiming.
5. Strategic Behavioral Adjustments
The findings of the previous sections show that a non-trivial fraction of people
could end up facing higher marginal tax rates when they are of an age to take
distributions from tax-deferred accounts than they did when contributing. However,
these findings may represent a worst-case scenario, because they assume that households
save and withdraw money mechanically, without responding to the tax incentives they
face each year. If the cost associated with this mechanical behavior is large, households
are likely to adopt strategic behavior that minimizes this cost. In particular, if the high
marginal tax rates result from the phase-in of Social Security taxability, households have
a large scope for strategic tax minimization.
What strategies might a household adopt to minimize this cost? First I consider
actions that might be taken ex-ante, or by a household that is contributing to retirement
savings and suspects that the marginal tax rate they currently face may be lower that the
rates they will face in retirement. If a Roth savings vehicle is available, this household
could contribute some or all of their retirement savings to this vehicle rather than to a tax-
deferred account. Although Roth 401(k)s became a legal possibility in 2006, many
employers do not yet choose to make this option available to employees, so most
households can only contribute to a Roth IRA. In 2006, if household income is less than
$160,000 ($XX) and the household is married filing jointly (single), each spouse can
contribute up to $4,000 (or the amount of their individual earnings, if it is less than
$4,000). Although this limit may be lower than the total amount a couple wishes to save,
it at least allows for some diversification. A second option that may be available to a pre-
retirement household facing a relatively low marginal tax rate is to roll-over funds from
an existing IRA or 401(k) into a Roth IRA, with two limitations. First, savings in a
401(k) from a current job cannot be rolled over while the individual remains employed at
the current company. Secondly, to accomplish the rollover, the household will have to
pay taxes on the entire amount being transferred. If the individual holding the account is
younger than 59 /2, using the funds in the account to pay the taxes will trigger a penalty
tax of 10% on the portion of the account that is not rolled over, which is likely to make
such a choice very unattractive. This difficulty can be circumvented if the household can
pay the taxes due out of current income or savings that is not tax-deferred'.
In addition, there are several strategies that a household could adopt ex-post, or
when it arrives at retirement with a large amount of tax-deferred wealth and faces high
marginal tax rates. If the high rates result from high income from other sources that may
not persist throughout retirement, a household might choose to take only minimum
distributions from tax-deferred accounts and spend down other assets until taxable capital
income becomes less substantial and the value of nominal pensions is eroded by inflation.
' Other options include taking a distribution from Roth principal, or accomplishing this transaction in 2010,
when penalty taxes are waived under current law.
However, if the high marginal rates are due to the phase-in of Social Security benefit
taxability or to the size of tax-deferred distributions, other strategies may make sense.
If the high marginal tax rates result from the phase in of Social Security benefit
taxability, it may be advantageous to limit the years in which the household takes a large
distribution and faces increased taxability of benefits. Mahaney and Carlson (2007)
indicates that a large tax-savings may be accomplished by waiting to claim Social
Security benefits for the primary earner until that person reaches age 70, and meanwhile
funding consumption by taking tax-deferred distributions. They argue that financial
planners tend to overestimate the returns to tax-deferred savings by ignoring investment
fees, as well as that the value of delaying the claiming of Social Security benefits by the
primary earners has increased in recent years due to the increase in the Full Retirement
age and a provision of the Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act (2000) that allows
spouses to claim spousal benefits when the primary earner has reached the full retirement
age but is not yet receiving benefits. Thus this opportunity for long-run tax-savings has
mostly been ignored, though it applies to many households that expect at least one
individual to live into their late seventies.
If the size of distributions contributes to the problem of high marginal rates, a
household might reduce their tax burden by "bunching" distributions over time--that is,
in one year the household could take a large distribution and face a high marginal tax
rate, and then in the following year(s) take only the minimum distribution (which may be
no distribution), incurring a lower average tax liability. In addition, the household has
the option of rolling over funds from a tax-deferred account into a Roth account. If the
account holder is over age 59 /2, the penalty tax will not be an issue. Because a large
rollover could still push the household into a very high marginal tax bracket, in some
cases, it will be advantageous to spread out the transfer over time, rolling over smaller
amounts each year. In many cases, the household might find it advantageous to combine
these strategies-to delay claiming Social Security benefits until after the rollovers are
accomplished.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I consider the question of how a married household that is nearing
retirement should allocate retirement savings across available vehicles-taxable savings
accounts, tax-deferred savings accounts, and Roth accounts. Overall, in any age 57 tax
rate bin, tax-deferred savings is optimal for the majority of households, but a substantial
minority do better with a Roth account. The probability of preferring a Roth account
increases for lower marginal tax rates and for earlier anticipated retirement withdrawals.
Because a household faces uncertainty about its future income and marginal tax rates, it
will generally be optimal to diversify retirement savings across both types of accounts.
In contrast, taxable accounts will never dominate a Roth account, and even if the Roth
account is not available, diversification between taxable accounts and tax-deferred
accounts will only make sense if the household is facing a marginal tax rate of 15% or
less, expected nominal returns are low, and the household will not be able to lower future
tax rates by bunching withdrawals or delaying the claiming of Social Security benefits.
Although the Social Security trap identified by Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Neumann (2001)
is real, it affects only a small percentage of households and its effects can be mitigated by
strategic behavioral responses.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Types of Tax-favored Accounts
IRA 401(k) Roth IRA Roth 401(k)

















Penalty tax on distributions before contributed
age 59 1/2? Yes Yes basis Yes
Minimum distribution required
after age 70 1/2? Yes Yes No Yes
Contribution limit for those under $4,000 $15,500 $4,000 $15,500






None (but phase out
phase-out of starts at
Income eligibility limit? deductibility) None $99,000) None
Possibility of loan to self against
assets? No Yes No Yes
Table 2: Value of Tax-favored Accounts





































of return, 15% capital income tax
t=5
Taxable Roth/TDA Equivalent
MTR Balance Balance MTR
0 1.530 1.649 7.2
10 1.377 1.484 16.5
15 1.300 1.401 21.1
25 1.147 1.237 30.4
28 1.101 1.187 33.2
33 1.025 1.105 37.8











1 After-tax balance in a taxable account of a $1 pre-tax contribution after t years, with a nominal rate of
return of r = 6% (or 10% in Panel B). This is computed as (1- rio)Ce r'rl , with rio, the marginal tax rate
faced at the time of making a contribution to the account, corresponding to the value in the first column,
and r, set as a constant equal to 15%.
2 After-tax balance in a Roth account of a $1 pre-tax contribution after t years. This is calculated as
(1- rio)Ce ", with rio, the MTR at the time of contribution, equal to the value in the first column.
Equivalently, this same number is the after-tax value of the balance in a tax-deferred account if withdrawn
after t years, for a household facing the specified MTR in year t: (1- i')Ce ".
3 Marginal tax rate that equalizes the after-tax value of the balance in a tax-deferred account distributed
after t years to that of a taxable account with contributions subject to the MTR in the first column. This is
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Table 3: 2003 Tax Brackets
Marginal Tax Rate Single Married Filing Jointly





35% Above $311,950 Above $311,950
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Full Sample
Age 57 Age 67
mean mean
% married 1.00 0.94
Number of dependents 0.07 0.09
Members of couple over 65 0.01 1.35
fraction >0 conditional fraction >0 conditional
mean mean
primary wages 0.79 $ 49,681 0.29 $ 22,710
secondary wages 0.63 $ 26,742 0.34 $ 22,222
dividends 0.52 $ 1,573 0.29 $ 2,532
other property income 0.43 $ 26,700 0.70 $ 26,381
pension income 0.06 $ 24,124 0.53 $ 23,190
social security income 0.07 $ 8,962 0.83 $ 14,563
non-taxable transfers 0.04 $ 10,838 0.10 $ 12,263
rent paid 0.07 $ 7,915 0.07 $ 6,210
property tax payments 0.81 $ 2,025 0.68 $ 16,955
deductible medical expenses
and charitable contributions 0.55 $ 3,763 0.47 $ 4,012
unemployment benefits 0.01 $ 3,060 0.01 $ 3,354
mortgage interest payments 0.43 $ 4,075 0.29 $ 4,656
Panel B: Sample with Tax-deferred Accounts
Age 57 Age 67
mean mean
% married 1.00 0.95
# dependents 0.07 0.08
# over 65 0.01 1.37
fraction >0 conditional fraction >0 conditional
mean mean
primary wages 0.85 $ 55,769 0.30 $ 25,074
secondary wages 0.69 $ 30,484 0.38 $ 23,117
dividends 0.60 $ 1,667 0.35 $ 2,513
other property income 0.45 $ 28,821 0.87 $ 33,077
pension income 0.07 $ 26,274 0.56 $ 25,360
social security income 0.05 $ 8,808 0.83 $ 15,182
non-taxable transfers 0.03 $ 11,586 0.08 $ 12,946
rent paid 0.04 $ 347 0.05 $ 7,415
property tax payments 0.85 $ 2,226 0.71 $ 16,286
deductible medical expenses
and charitable contributions 0.62 $ 3,961 0.53 $ 4,280
unemployment benefits 0.01 $ 3,221 0.01 $ 3,737
mortgage interest payments 0.45 $ 4,296 0.29 $ 5,023
Table 5: Marginal Tax Rate Distributions at Selected Ages'
Panel A: First Dollar MTR
Age 33 or
0 10 15 25 28 above
57 11.0% 10.4% 40.5% 29.2% 5.9% 2.9%
62 16.7% 14.9% 36.2% 23.4% 5.7% 3.1%
65 30.9% 17.1% 25.5% 16.2% 7.3% 2.8%
69 45.7% 13.0% 21.4% 9.1% 8.6% 2.1%
Panel B: Last Dollar MTR (Sample with Tax-Deferred Accounts)
Age 33 or
0 10 15 25 28 above
57 5.8% 7.5% 39.5% 34.4% 7.6% 5.2%
62 8.7% 11.1% 35.2% 31.0% 8.6% 5.5%
65 19.1% 14.9% 27.3% 23.0% 10.9% 4.8%
69 32.2% 12.7% 23.6% 14.7% 13.3% 3.4%
Marginal tax rates on contributions to or distributions from tax-deferred accounts as computed by
NBER's TAXSIM program, adjusted to calculate MTRs based on the 2003 tax code and the real value of
Social Security benefit taxability thresholds in each year.
Table 6: Distributions of First-Dollar Marginal Tax Rates by Age 57 MTR
Age 57 MTR 0% 10 % 15 % 25 % 28 % 33 % or
above
Age 57
Distribution 11.0% 10.4% 40.5% 29.2% 5.9% 2.9%
Age 62 MTR
0% 54.1% 21.1% 12.6% 8.1% 2.9% 6.5%
10 % 21.6% 33.2% 14.8% 8.2% 9.5% 5.4%
15 % 18.9% 36.3% 50.8% 27.9% 22.0% 10.1%
25 % 3.1% 9.0% 16.5% 45.8% 34.0% 20.7%
28 % 2.0% 0.0% 4.3% 7.2% 22.8% 15.3%
33 % or above 0.4% 0.5% 1.0% 2.8% 8.9% 42.0%
Age 65 MTR
0 % 59.7% 36.7% 30.0% 18.9% 19.6% 12.2%
10 % 15.6% 27.5% 20.5% 12.1% 9.3% 6.1%
15 % 17.1% 24.5% 28.1% 26.6% 26.5% 16.6%
25 % 5.4% 8.0% 14.5% 25.4% 27.1% 22.0%
28 % 1.4% 2.5% 5.8% 13.2% 10.5% 12.6%
33 % or above 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 3.8% 7.0% 30.6%
Age 69 MTR
0 % 66.8% 55.4% 47.8% 31.9% 27.8% 35.0%
10 % 10.1% 10.9% 16.1% 12.2% 8.3% 9.7%
15 % 11.9% 21.8% 19.5% 28.8% 23.7% 14.5%
25 % 6.1% 6.5% 6.4% 12.7% 16.8% 18.7%
28 % 4.7% 5.2% 9.1% 11.2% 19.7% 5.4%
33 % or above 0.4% 0.3% 1.0% 3.3% 3.7% 16.8%
Table 7: First-Dollar Preferences for Roth or Taxable Accounts over Tax-deferred
Accounts
Panel A: Panel A: Percentages that Prefer a Roth Account to a Tax-deferred Account'
Age 57 MTR Age 62 Age 65 Age 69
0% 45.9% 40.0% 32.6%
10% 48.1% 38.2% 34.5%
15% 25.2% 23.9% 19.3%
25% 14.8% 21.0% 16.7%
28% 13.8% 10.3% 9.5%
33% or above 13.8% 17.5% 9.5%
All 25.8% 25.3% 20.7%
Panel B: Percentages that Prefer a Taxable Account to a Tax-deferred Account,
assuming a 6% nominal rate of return2
Age 57 MTR Age 62 Age 65 Age 69
0% 45.9% 39.6% 32.6%
10% 45.8% 13.4% 11.8%
15% 21.7% 21.4% 14.4%
25% 5.7% 3.8% 2.9%
28% 8.9% 7.0% 0.3%
33% or above 2.9% 0.0% 0.0%
All 20.9% 15.9% 11.5%
Panel C: Percentages that Prefer a Taxable Account to a Tax-deferred Account,
assuming a 10% nominal rate of return3
Age 57 MTR Age 62 Age 65 Age 69
0% 45.5% 24.5% 11.0%
10% 11.9% 11.3% 8.0%
15% 21.7% 14.6% 3.1%
25% 2.6% 3.8% 0.0%
28% 8.9% 1.2% 0.0%
33% or above 2.9% 0.0% 0.0%
All 16.4% 11.0% 3.3%
' In other words, the percentage of households facing a higher MTR at later ages than they faced at age 57.
2 Percentage of households facing a MTR at later ages that exceeds the equivalent MTR associated with
their age 57 rate, based on a 6% return.
3 Percentage of households facing a MTR at later ages that exceeds the equivalent MTR associated with
their age 57 rate, based on a 10% return.
Table 8: Distributions of Last Dollar Marginal Tax Rates by Age 57 MTR for Sample
with Tax-deferred Accounts
Age 57 MTR 0% 10 % 15 % 25 % 28 % 33 % or
above
Age 57
Distribution 5.8% 7.5% 39.5% 34.4% 7.6% 5.2%
Age 62 MTR
0 % 24.0% 10.7% 10.2% 6.0% 1.1% 2.7%
10 % 25.1% 22.0% 12.0% 7.7% 5.3% 3.3%
15 % 44.3% 50.9% 49.6% 22.2% 13.1% 10.5%
25 % 4.7% 14.9% 23.5% 46.4% 41.6% 23.0%
28 % 1.0% 0.8% 3.7% 13.7% 21.9% 18.3%
33 % or above 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 4.0% 17.0% 42.2%
Age 65 MTR
0 % 25.3% 25.6% 22.7% 15.0% 8.8% 8.1%
10 % 29.9% 22.3% 17.8% 9.9% 2.7% 5.0%
15 % 30.1% 33.6% 29.1% 25.2% 28.8% 13.4%
25 % 6.4% 15.7% 19.8% 28.6% 34.6% 33.2%
28 % 5.4% 2.7% 9.5% 15.6% 14.2% 12.0%
33 % or above 2.9% 0.0% 1.2% 5.8% 10.9% 28.4%
Age 69 MTR
0 % 49.1% 42.2% 38.6% 21.3% 19.5% 20.6%
10 % 17.1% 14.4% 13.9% 13.9% 7.8% 4.7%
15 % 17.4% 29.2% 21.8% 26.5% 20.9% 19.6%
25 % 8.1% 6.9% 10.7% 19.7% 25.0% 23.1%
28 % 7.4% 7.0% 13.9% 14.8% 16.7% 18.6%
33 % or above 0.9% 0.5% 1.1% 3.7% 10.1% 13.4%
Table 9: Last Dollar Preferences for Roth or Taxable Accounts over Tax-deferred
Accounts, Sample with Tax-deferred Accounts
Panel A: Percentages that Prefer a Roth Account to a Tax-deferred Account'
Age 57 MTR Age 62 Age 65 Age 69
0% 76.0% 74.8% 50.9%
10% 69.5% 53.5% 42.8%
15% 32.1% 33.6% 29.6%
25% 23.0% 25.7% 20.5%
28% 18.5% 13.7% 17.1%
33% or above 15.5% 19.9% 8.9%
All 32.4% 32.5% 26.6%
Panel B: Percentages that Prefer a Taxable Account to a Tax-deferred Account,
assuming a 6% nominal rate of return 2
Age 57 MTR Age 62 Age 65 Age 69
0% 76.0% 73.8% 49.0%
10% 67.4% 19.5% 14.1%
15% 28.3% 30.3% 22.3%
25% 10.1% 5.8% 3.4%
28% 17.0% 9.5% 1.8%
33% or above 2.1% 0.0% 0.0%
All 25.5% 20.4% 14.0%
Panel C: Percentages that Prefer a Taxable Account to a Tax-deferred Account,
assuming a 10% nominal rate of return 3
Age 57 MTR Age 62 Age 65 Age 69
0% 75.1% 44.8% 16.4%
10% 17.6% 17.1% 11.9%
15% 28.3% 21.9% 3.9%
25% 3.5% 5.8% 0.3%
28% 17.0% 2.8% 0.0%
33% or above 2.1% 0.0% 0.0%
All 19.4% 14.7% 3.5%
In other words, the percentage of households facing a higher MTR at later ages than they faced at age 57.
2 Percentage of households facing a MTR at later ages that exceeds the equivalent MTR associated with
their age 57 rate, based on a 6% return.
3 Percentage of households facing a MTR at later ages that exceeds the equivalent MTR associated with
their age 57 rate, based on a 10% return.
Table 10: Distribution of Taxable Income at Ages 62, 65, and 69, by Age 57 Tax Bracket
Age 57 Tax 0% 10 % 15 % 25 % 28 % 33 % or
Bracket 35 %
Taxable Below $1 - $14,001- $56,801- $114,651- Above
Income $0 $14,000 $56,800 $114,650 $174,700 $174,701




0 % 54.0% 25.6% 13.7% 12.1% 6.3% 3.6%
10 % 11.7% 16.1% 9.3% 7.2% 2.4% 7.0%
15 % 18.8% 37.0% 67.5% 18.9% 9.7% 3.7%
25 % 11.7% 19.3% 26.0% 45.2% 33.6% 20.1%
28 % 2.7% 2.1% 5.2% 14.8% 41.6% 25.4%
33 % 1.1% 0.0% 1.3% 1.4% 98.6% 31.0%
35 % 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 1.4% 9.2%
Percent in
Higher Tax
Bracket at 62 46.0% 58.4% 32.5% 16.7% 6.5% 9.2%
Age 65 Tax
Bracket
0 % 58.8% 43.8% 32.6% 26.6% 18.7% 12.1%
10 % 8.5% 20.3% 15.2% 12.4% 7.3% 3.9%
15 % 20.7% 25.2% 31.5% 25.0% 18.3% 25.1%
25 % 7.1% 9.1% 14.8% 24.9% 32.2% 21.9%
28 % 3.4% 0.0% 5.6% 8.5% 16.9% 28.3%
33 % 0.8% 1.7% 0.2% 2.2% 5.8% 14.4%
35 % 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8% 10.3%
Percent in
Higher Tax
Bracket at 65 41.3% 36.0% 20.7% 11.1% 6.6% 10.3%
Age 69 Tax
Bracket
0 % 66.8% 64.7% 51.4% 44.0% 32.8% 37.8%
10 % 8.2% 10.9% 13.2% 13.0% 9.8% 5.5%
15 % 14.1% 18.6% 22.3% 24.0% 24.4% 13.2%
25 % 8.8% 5.8% 10.2% 13.2% 19.8% 14.7%
28 % 1.7% 0.0% 1.9% 4.1% 9.7% 19.8%
33 % 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 1.5% 2.2% 3.4%
35 % 0.4% 0.0% 0.5% 0.2% 1.3% 5.7%
Percent in
Higher Tax
Bracket at 69 33.2% 24.4% 13.1% 5.8% 3.5% 5.7%
Table 11: Percentages of Households Still Earning Wages, for Various Samples
Panel A: Percentage of Households with at least One Wage-earner
MTR >6% MTR >10%
Age All Households Higher MTR Equivalent Equivalent
62 77.4% 84.2% 82.8% 84.5%
65 60.1% 71.6% 71.5% 72.4%
69 42.9% 58.7% 60.9% 50.3%
Panel B: Percentage of Households with Two Wage-earners
MTR >6% MTR >10%
Age All Households Higher MTR Equivalent Equivalent
62 37.3% 44.4% 40.9% 42.0%
65 21.7% 33.1% 30.3% 29.9%
69 10.4% 19.0% 20.5% 18.7%
Table 12: Percentages of Households Widowed, for Various Samples
MTR >6% MTR >10%
Age All Households Higher MTR Equivalent Equivalent
62 1.52% 0.51% 0.45% 0.46%
65 3.58% 1.62% 1.80% 1.95%
69 7.54% 4.14% 4.25% 2.23%
Table 13: Distribution of Social Security Taxability for Households Receiving Social
Security Benefits
Panel A: Age 62
Phase-in to SS Benefits Phase-in to SS BenefitsSS Benefits 50% 50% 85% 85%Not TaxableSample Taxability Taxable Taxability Taxable
No Effect MTR*1.5 No Effect MTR*1.85 No Effect
All
Households 46.1% 3.6% 25.8% 2.3% 22.3%
Higher MTR 22.6% 10.7% 22.5% 9.6% 34.5%
MTR>6%
Equivalent 24.7% 12.9% 22.8% 7.8% 31.8%
MTR>10%
Equivalent 21.3% 15.9% 18.2% 9.6% 35.0%
Panel B: Age 65
Sample SS Benefits Phase-in to SS Benefits Phase-in to SS Benefits
50% 50% 85% 85%Not Taxable
Taxability Taxable Taxability Taxable
No Effect MTR*1.5 No Effect MTR*1.85 No Effect
All
Households 46.8% 8.5% 13.3% 6.1% 25.3%
Higher MTR 12.6% 15.7% 10.4% 22.5% 38.9%
MTR>6%
Equivalent 13.5% 21.9% 8.5% 18.2% 38.0%
MTR>10%
Equivalent 4.5% 8.5% 12.2% 27.1% 47.7%
Panel C: Age 69
Sample SS Benefits Phase-in to SS Benefits Phase-in to SS Benefits
50% 50% 85% 85%Not Taxable Taxability Taxable Taxability Taxable
No Effect MTR* 1.5 No Effect MTR* 1.85 No Effect
All
Households 49.3% 12.2% 3.7% 8.8% 26.1%
Higher MTR 6.6% 13.1% 5.0% 35.0% 40.3%
MTR>6%
Equivalent 8.6% 6.8% 3.2% 34.4% 47.1%
MTR>10%
Equivalent 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 42.0% 51.2%
Figure 1: SS benefit taxation aggregate revenues in real 2003 $
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Appendix: Tax-favored Savings Accounts
The first type of tax-favored account made available in the United States was the
Keogh Plan in 1962, allowing self-employed individuals and unincorporated businesses
to set up pensions paralleling any approved employer-sponsored pension plan. Thus
those that qualified for a Keogh pension could set up a tax-deferred savings account
patterned after a money-purchase plan or profit-sharing plan, or even a defined benefit
plan. Such plans were subject to the same rules and contribution limits as the comparable
employer-sponsored plans.
Tax-deferred savings at the individual level was then offered to all American tax-
payers through Individual Retirement Accounts, or IRAs, which were introduced by tax
code amendments that were part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 1974. As additional types of IRAs have proliferated in subsequent years, the
original IRA has come to be designated a traditional IRA. These accounts can be set up
at almost any financial institution, and can contain almost any type of asset (some types
of real estate, including residences, are excluded). Anyone can set up an account and
make contributions of up to $4,000 in 2007 (or the individual's earnings, if less than
$4,000), or up to $5,000 if they are over age 50. Contributions can no longer be made
after an individual has reached age 70 ½/2. For those with tax-filing status of married
filing jointly (single) and a modified adjusted gross income' (MAGI) less than $83,000
($52,000), contributions are fully tax-deductible. The deductibility of contributions is
gradually phased out until MAGI reaches $103,000 ($62,000). No tax is levied on any
1 The MAGI that applies for IRA eligibility is calculated by adding non-taxable interest, excluded foreign
income/housing and several deductions back into the adjusted gross income calculated on an individual's
1040 tax form. Deductions that must be added back into MAGI include deductible IRA contributions,
interest on student loans, tuition payments, and adoption benefits.
financial accrual that takes place within the account, and when funds are distributed from
the account, distributions are taxed as ordinary income, with an adjustment for the basis
of taxable contributions. Distributions taken before the account holder reaches age 59 1/2
are subject to an additional penalty tax of 10%, with some exceptions for disability,
medical expenditures, and the purchase of a first home. Starting at age 70 1/2, the account
holder must take annual minimum distributions or be subject to a 50% tax on the amount
of the required distribution. The minimum distribution is equal to some percentage of the
account balance, determined by the age of the account holder and sometimes her spouse.
The primary attraction of an IRA is its tax-favored status-in effect, this type of account
eliminates taxation of capital income as well as deferring taxation of ordinary income
until retirement.
In 1978, Congress amended the tax code by adding section 401(k), which allowed
employers to provide tax-deferred retirement savings accounts for employees. The
offering of such plans gradually increased after the rules were clarified in 1981, and
similar plans have been added to the tax code to make tax-deferred savings available to
employees of non-profit corporations such as educational institutions and hospitals
(section 403(b)) and employees of state and local governments (section 457). In contrast
to IRAs, these plans are offered and managed by the employer, who is responsible for
choosing investment options and negotiating fees. Investment options typically include
various mutual funds with different percentages of stocks, bonds, and money market
funds, and often company stock as well. Employees then choose how to allocate their
account balances across the available investment options. Employees can elect to have
some part of their wages paid directly into the account, and many employers also
contribute to the accounts, either by matching some percentage of the employee's
contribution or by making independent contributions. All funds are non-taxable at the
time of contribution, unless contributed to a designated Roth account, as will be
explained below. Generally any employee is eligible to contribute to a 401(k) if the
employer offers such a plan, making tax-deferred savings available to many that are
disqualified from tax-deferred contributions to an IRA because of high income. In
addition, the contribution limits are significantly higher than the contribution limits to an
IRA: $15,500 per employee under 50 years old in 2007, and $20,500 for employees over
50 years of age. Distributions from 401 (k) accounts are taxable as ordinary income and
subject to similar rules as IRAs-penalty taxes are levied on most distributions before
age 59 /2, and minimum distributions are required after age 70 1/2 unless the account
holder remains an employee of the company providing the plan. One significant
difference is that many 401(k) plans offer participants the ability to make a loan to
oneself against the assets for a period of up to five years and at a specified interest rate.
However, default on such a loan is treated as a distribution and thus subject to both
regular and penalty taxes, as applicable. When an employee with a 401(k) account leaves
the firm, she has several options-she can leave the money in the firm's 401(k) (but can
no longer make contributions), she can "rollover" the account into an IRA, or if she
begins employment at another firm offering a 401(k), she can rollover the account into
the new firm's 401(k). Defined contribution plans such as 401(k)s, 403(b)s and 457s
have become increasing popular among both firms and employees-to firms because of
their administrative simplicity, and to employees because they provide large scope for
tax-deferred savings. In addition, the tax code now makes available specialized IRAs to
the self-employed and small businesses (SEP IRAs and Simple IRAs), further extending
the reach of tax-deferred savings opportunities.
Another amendment to the tax code was sponsored by Senator William Roth in
1998, creating a tax-favored IRA that is not tax-deferred. Contributions to a Roth IRA
are not tax-deductible, but neither accrual within the account nor distributions from the
account are taxable. Because funds contributed to the accounts have already been subject
to tax, the principal invested (but not the accrual) can be withdrawn without facing a
penalty tax at any time after the account has been open for five years, or "seasoned." In
addition, Roth IRAs are never subject to minimum distribution requirements, and
contributions can be made at any age. The opportunity to contribute to a Roth IRA is
limited by income-for those married filing jointly (single), eligibility begins to phase
out at a MAGI of $156,000 ($99,000) and is fully phased out when MAGI reaches
$166,000 ($114,000). Also, the sum of annual contributions to traditional IRAs and
Roth IRAs must not exceed the annual limits specified for IRAs. In spite of the relatively
low contribution limits, Roth IRA balances may be important to retirement savings of
many Americans because individuals can rollover a 401(k) (or another IRA) into a Roth
IRA instead of a traditional IRA if they prefer. This has the consequence of incurring tax
liability for the funds rolled over in the year of the rollover. After a seasoning period of
five years, contributions that have been rolled over can be withdrawn without penalty,
just like regular Roth IRA contributions. Roth IRA accounts have become popular for
those who expect a higher marginal tax rate in retirement, either because of low current
income, large deductions, or the expectation that future statutory rates will increase.
The popularity of Roth IRAs led to the addition of a Roth 401(k) option in 2006.
Under the new law, firms may choose to give their employees the option of creating a
designated Roth account within the 401(k) plan, to which after-tax employee
contributions (but not employer contributions) may be directed. These funds are not
taxable upon withdrawal, but in other respects the accounts are similar to tax-deferred
401(k)s-they have the same contribution limits, and the same rules regarding the ages at
which distributions avoid penalty taxes and at which minimum distributions are required.
At the current time, few companies have made such plans available, partly because they
increase the administrative burden on the firm by potentially doubling the number of
accounts the firm must track. However, because of the attractiveness of Roth-style tax-
favoring to employees, it is likely that Roth 401(k) offerings will increase over time.
